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Abstract 
This paper updates the current knowledge about Black-White wage inequality in 
the US male labor market by using the NLSY97 sample. Compared with the 
results obtained from the NLSY79 cohort, I find that the unconditional racial 
wage inequality is smaller today, but after controlling for premarket academic 
skills, the conditional racial wage gap remains roughly the same as it was twenty 
years ago. After dividing the labor market by occupational categories, I find that 
in the white collar sector, the racial wage gap has largely disappeared even 
without controlling for academic skills. In the blue collar sector, academic skills 
can fully account for the unconditional racial wage gap among clerical jobs but 
there still remains a substantial conditional racial wage gap among craftsman and 
laborer jobs. I show that clerical jobs are more similar to white collar jobs than 
blue collar jobs today. The racial wage inequality also has disappeared among the 
operative workers, probably due to omitted variable bias. For the remaining racial 
wage gap in the craftsman and laborer jobs, both preference-based and statistical 
models of discrimination are consistent with the findings.   
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I. Introduction 
 The black-white wage gap has declined substantially from 1940s to 1980s 
(Smith & Welch, 1986). There are many explanations for this convergence: 
relative increase in quantity and quality of education, black migration out of the 
South, Federal civil rights policies, and declining labor force participation of low-
skilled blacks (Smith & Welch, 1986; Donohue & Heckman, 1991). However, the 
improvement stagnated after 1980s and a substantial racial wage gap persists into 
21st century (black men on average earn around 75% as white men do). While 
factors such as migration and Federal policies played important roles in the 
convergence before 1980s, their impacts are less obvious after 1980s. Many 
theories argued that the earning inequality today is largely due to the differences 
in education attainment and academic skills acquisition. Neal and Johnson (1996) 
found that premarket academic skills, as measure by AFQT scores, could account 
for three quarters of the black-white wage gap. Bjerk (2007) divided the labor 
market into blue collar sector and white collar sector and found that while the 
differences in academic skills could fully account for the racial wage gap in 
white-collar jobs, they only account for half of the wage gap among blue-collar 
jobs. Therefore, he argued that the observed racial wage gap in the market is 
mainly due to the inequality in the blue-collar sector. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to update the current knowledge about 
the effects of premarket academic skills on racial wage inequality in the US labor 
market by using the most recent data from NLSY97. Most existing literatures 
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about the racial inequality in labor market used the sample from NLSY79. As the 
individuals in the NLSY97 cohort reached their late 20s or early 30s in the latest 
round of interview (round 15), they were at the same age as the individuals in 
Neal and Johnson (1996) and Bjerk (2007) papers using the NLSY79 sample. By 
comparing my results from the NLSY97 cohort with the results obtained by 
previous studies from the NLSY79 cohort, I’m able to find the changes occurred 
in the US labor market over the last 20 years.  
Due to the complexity in the female job market, I only focus on the 
earning differences between black and white males in this paper.  Similar to Bjerk 
(2007), I not only examine the labor market as a whole but also divide the market 
into two occupational sectors (white-collar and blue-collar) and look at several 
subgroups in each of these sectors. Compared with the older cohort in NLSY79, I 
find that the unconditional wage gap between black and white male workers 
further narrowed down in the last 20 years. Black men on average earned 22% 
less than white men in 2009 compared to 28% less in early 1990s. After 
controlling for premarket academic skills, as measured by AFQT scores, the wage 
gap among white-collar jobs disappears; but for the blue-collar sector as a whole, 
academic skills only account for one-third of the wage inequality, with a 13% 
conditional wage gap unexplained. Interestingly, among the subgroups in blue-
collar sector, the wage inequality in the clerical and operative jobs disappears 
while the gap remains significant and substantial for craftsmen and laborers. This 
might suggest that the nature of clerical and operative jobs has changed from 20 
years ago and their work resembles those of white-collar jobs more than those of 
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blue-collar jobs. And all of the racial wage inequality in the US male labor market 
comes from craftsman and laborer jobs. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II summarizes the 
previous literature about labor market racial inequality; Section III introduces the 
data and methods I use in this study; Section VI summarizes the results from 
regressions; Section V discusses the potential explanations for the different wage 
inequality across occupational sectors; Section VI discusses the problem of labor 
market participation; Section VII concludes. 
II. Related Literature 
 While the racial difference in years of schooling has declined considerably 
during the 20th century, there still remained large differences in the actual 
academic achievement (usually measured by achievement scores). O’Neill (1990) 
argued that the decline in the racial difference in schooling together with the 
migration of blacks out of the South contributed to the narrowing of racial wage 
gap before 1980s, and the remaining wage gap to a large extent comes from the 
differences in academic achievement. Using AFQT scores as the measure of 
academic skills, he found that skills were highly correlated with future earnings 
and accounted for a substantial fraction of the black-white wage inequality.  
 Neal and Johnson (1996) pointed out that a problem with many studies on 
labor market inequality is that they included endogenous variables such as 
postsecondary education and work experience in their models, which are the 
choices made by the individuals and could be affected by market discrimination, 
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and therefore their results were biased.  By controlling only for the premarket 
factors, they found that academic skills could explain three-quarters of the black-
white wage gap. One policy implication from this study is that improving black 
students’ academic skills can narrow down the unconditional racial wage gap. But 
the question is how. One might argue that improving the school quality will help, 
especially the quality of those schools with predominantly black students. 
However, Grogger (1996) found that the inputs usually thought to be related to 
school quality, such as student-teacher ratio, class size and term length, have little 
effect on wages. Discrimination at school is also a big concern. Figlio (2005) 
found that teachers have lower expectations for students with distinctive black 
names and these in turn negatively affect students’ cognitive performance and test 
scores.   
 Depending on the authors’ belief about how long the premarket factors 
will matter into the labor market and how long discrimination will persist on the 
job, different papers choose different age groups to look at. On the one hand, as 
statistical discrimination models suggest, some employers use characteristics such 
as education and race as proxies of certain variables related to ability but 
unobservable during the hiring process, such as certain test scores (Altonji & 
Pierret, 2001). Therefore, estimating the effect of academic skills on wages when 
the employees have just entered their jobs could be biased and underestimate the 
effect of skills. On the other hand, if we look at the wages of employers when 
they have been in the labor market for a very long time, we might be testing the 
effect of trainings and experiences rather than the premarket skills. What’s more, 
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one could assume that some discrimination is based on prejudice and is quite 
persistent. If it is the case, the older age group we look at, the larger wage 
inequality we will see because discrimination can be a self-fulfilling prophecy 
which affects the group being discriminated against increasingly negatively as 
time goes by.  According to Farber and Gibbons (1991), as observations of actual 
performance and ability accumulate, the impact of schooling on employers’ 
inference process decreases. However, the effect of schooling on wages is 
independent of market experiences. More importantly, they found that time 
invariant variables related to ability but unobservable by employers (such as 
AFQT scores) are increasingly correlated with wages as experience accumulates. 
Therefore, it’s reasonable to examine the effect of academic skills on the wage 
gap when the workers are roughly 10 years into the labor market, as Neal and 
Johnson (1996) and Bjerk (2007) did in their papers. 
III. Data 
D. NLSY97 
 The primary labor market and demographic data used in this analysis 
come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The 
NLSY97 sample is a panel data of 8,984 individuals born between 1980 and 
1984. They received the first interview in 1997 at an age of 12 to18 and a survey 
was administrated each year after that to create a true panel data set. At the time 
of their round 15 interviews (the most recent survey), the individuals aged from 
26 to 32, making the sample comparable to the NLSY79 cohort used in former 
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studies by Neal and Johnson (1996) and Bjerk (2007). The types of information 
gathered in the two surveys and the interview methods are largely similar, making 
the data comparable between the two cohorts. The NLSY97 sample consists of a 
cross-sectional sample of 6,748 respondents and a supplement sample of 2,236 
respondents to oversample Hispanic or Latino and black people. My analysis 
combines the white and black males in the cross-section sample and the black 
males in the supplemental sample. The dataset contains a large amount of 
information one each respondent. In my analysis, I only use the data on education, 
demographics, income and employment for each individual. And my sample only 
includes the respondents with valid AFQT test scores, educational attainment 
data, and valid wage and occupation data in at least one year between 2008 and 
2010. The time interval is chosen to make my age group comparable to that in 
Bjerk (2007).  
 I limit my sample to individuals under 18 years old when they took the 
AFQT test at 1998. I’m interested in the effect of human capital on future wages. 
Postsecondary education and job experience will surely enhance skills. But as 
Neal and Johnson (1996) pointed out, these variables are endogenous. In other 
words, going to college or obtaining trainings are the choices made by individuals 
and they are affected by discrimination. If I include these as regressors, my results 
will be biased. By restricting my sample to respondents aged 18 or younger by the 
time they took the test, I can make sure most of them hadn’t entered the job 
market or started postsecondary education and therefore their scores were not 
affected by discrimination.  
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B. AFQT Score 
 In 1998, most NLSY97 respondents (79.3%) participated in the 
administration of the computer-adaptive form of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB), a military enlistment test battery. The CAT-
ASVAB consists of ten power and two speeded subtests that measure different 
vocational aptitude, among which four subtests: Mathematical Knowledge (MK), 
Arithmetic Reasoning (AR), Word Knowledge (WK), and Paragraph 
Comprehension (PC), were used to create a summary percentile score variable. 
The formula to generate this variable is similar to the AFQT score generated by 
the Department of Defense for the NLSY79 cohort. However, the two test scores 
are different in several ways. Firstly, the NLSY79 cohort took the paper and 
pencil test while the new ASVAB test was administrated on computer. Secondly, 
each of the NLSY97 participants was assigned a percentile score between 0 and 
99 among each three-month age group. Therefore, I don’t need to adjust the 
scores for the age. Thirdly, the new variable is neither generated nor endorsed by 
the Department of Defense. For these reasons, the test scores of the two cohorts 
are not directly comparable. But since they are both measuring the same thing 
(academic skills or vocational aptitude), the effect of the scores on wages should 
still be comparable. And since the new test score is calculated in a similar way as 
AFQT, for simplicity, I’ll just refer to this variable as AFQT score in this paper. I 
normalize the test scores in order to use them in my regressions.  
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 Neal and Johnson (1996) argued that AFQT is a racially unbiased measure 
of basic skills. But Bjerk (2007) pointed out that although it’s better than years of 
schooling, it is still affected by many other factors such as parents’ education and 
school quality. Therefore it is a noisy measure of academic skills. But it’s a 
reasonable one to use in my analysis. My results can be interpreted as the 
proportion of the wage gap that can be explained by the difference in premarket 
academic skills. 
C. Occupational Sectors 
In order to examine the wage inequality in more detail, I follow Bjerk 
(2007) methodology by dividing the overall labor market into several mutually 
exclusive occupational categories including professional and technical 
occupations, managerial occupations, clerical workers, craftsmen, operatives, 
laborers, sales workers, and service workers based on job titles. NLSY97 uses the 
2002 Census Industrial & Occupational Classification Codes to classify 
occupations, which is different from the NLSY79 cohort which used the 1970 
Census Occupational Classification System. Although the coding systems are 
different, the resulting categories are largely similar. Bjerk (2007) classified each 
occupational category into either white collar sector or blue collar sector based on 
the frequency different tasks were performed on the job using data from the 
Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI). Specifically, professional 
workers and managerial workers were significantly more likely to perform tasks 
that require academic skills, including writing, reading and math, on a daily basis 
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than clerical workers, craftsmen, operatives and laborer. Therefore, he referred to 
professional and managerial occupations as white collar jobs, or “more 
academically skill-intensive” jobs, and clerical occupations, craftsmen, operatives 
and laborers as blue collar jobs, or “less academically skill-intensive” jobs. Sales 
workers and services workers were discussed separately because the jobs in these 
two categories are quite heterogeneous and could not be labeled as “white-collar” 
or “blue-collar” easily. I assume the nature of these jobs didn’t change 
dramatically in the last 20 years and use the same classification as Bjerk (2007). 
In Results section, I will show that this assumption is largely correct except for 
the clerical jobs. The examples of job titles within each category using the 2002 
Census Industrial & Occupational Classification Codes are given in Table 1. 
D. Wage and Control Variables 
 My dependent variable is the natural logarithm of each individual’s 
average wage during the 3-year period between 2008 and 2010. One potential 
problem of this method is that it results in a smaller sample size, especially after 
dividing the overall sample into the distinct categories. A small sample size could 
lead to non-significant results and make the interpretation of my results more 
complicated. 
To avoid the endogeneity problem with respect to education, I only 
generate a dummy for 12 years or more of education to control for years of 
schooling. Other control variables include AFQT score, AFQT score squared, age, 
region of the country, and parent’s education.  
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IV. Results1 
A. Examining Wage Inequality in the Overall Labor Market  
 I first examine the unconditional wage inequality between black and white 
workers in the overall labor market by running the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression of natural logarithm of each individual’s average wage between 2008 
and 2010 on a race indicator dummy and the individual’s age in year 2009. The 
coefficient on the race dummy in Column 1 of Table 2 shows that black male 
workers on average earn 22 percent less than their white peers in their late 
twenties. The unconditional wage gap obtained from this regression is 
substantially smaller than the one obtained by Bjerk (2007), who found a 28 
percent gap between the two races using the NLSY79 cohort. This change 
suggests that the wage gap between black and white male workers in the overall 
labor market has further narrowed down in the last twenty years. In other words, 
the convergence has resumed after a stage of stagnation between 1980s and early 
2000s.  Column 2 of Table 2 shows that after controlling for the years of 
education and region of residence, there still remains a 20 percent wage gap 
across the races. The small change doesn’t mean that education plays a minor role 
in future earnings. But it confirms Neal and Johnson’s (1996) critics that years of 
schooling is a very noisy measure of education attainment and itself is affected by 
discrimination and therefore it underestimates the real effect of academic skills.  
In specification 3, I further control for AFQT scores as the measure of  
1 For reference, results obtained by Bjerk (2007) using NLSY79 can be found in Appendix. 
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Table 2 
      OLS Log Wage Regressions (Whole Labor Market) 
   
Specification 
Conditioning Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.12*** -0.11*** 
   
(0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034) 
AFQT score — — 0.11*** 0.08*** 
     
(0.016) (0.018) 
AFQT score squared — — -0.03** -0.03* 
     
(0.016) (0.016) 
Age -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
   
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
12 years or more of education — 0.17*** — 0.09*** 
    
(0.031) 
 
(0.033) 
Controls for region of country No yes yes yes 
Controls for parent's education No no no yes 
Number of observations 2144       
              
Note: The sample used in this analysis comes from the NLSY97 and consists of observations in the years 
2008-2010, for male white and black workers in both the cross-section sample and black oversample, with 
valid ASVAB test scores, and a valid wage and occupation. AFQT scores are normalized to have a 
population mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors are in parentheses. One asterisk 
indicates significance at 10 percent level, two asterisks indicate significance at 5 percent level, three asterisks 
indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
academic skills instead of years of schooling in my regression. As shown in 
Column 3 of Table 2, the wage differential falls to 12 percent. After further 
controlling for regions and parents’ level of education completed, the gap further 
decreases to 11 percent, as shown in Column 4 of Table 2. This means the racial 
differences in pre-market human capital accumulation as measured by AFQT 
scores can explain half of the earning gap between blacks and whites. The result 
of conditional racial wage gap is very similar to the one obtained by Bjerk (2007) 
as shown in Table 8 in the Appendix. However, the fraction of wage differential 
that can be explained by differences in pre-market academic skills is smaller in 
my study. This does not mean that education plays a less important role today or 
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those policies that aim to alleviate academic skill gap and therefore reducing the 
wage gap are less useful. Note that the wage gap after controlling for test scores is 
similar to the results obtained by previous studies. It is the unconditional wage 
gap being smaller that leads to the smaller proportion that can be explained by 
academic skills. Therefore, we should interpret this change as a good sign because 
it implies that there is better education equality today.  
After controlling for academic skills, there still exists a substantial 12 
percent racial wage gap. To examine this unexplained portion of wage gap, I 
follow Bjerk’s (2007) methodology to divide the labor market into mutually 
exclusive occupational sectors as I explained in the Data section. This helps me 
better understand the causes of labor market discrimination and enables me to 
compare the changes occurred in different occupational categories during the last 
twenty years.  
B. Wage Inequality in the White Collar Sector   
Table 3 shows the results from OLS log wage regressions for the white collar 
sector. The independent variables in the two columns under each sub-category are 
the same as those in Column 1 and 4 in Table 2. Results in Column 5 and 6 show 
that the black white collar workers today only earn slightly less (6 percent) than 
the white workers, and the difference is not statistically significant. After 
controlling for academic skills, the coefficient before the black dummy variable 
indicates that the black workers are not earning any less than their equally skilled 
white counterparts, if not more. The coefficient on AFQT scores is positive and  
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significant, suggesting that academic skills are important in accounting for the 
wage differential between black and white white-collar workers.  The results for 
unconditional log wage regressions show that for both professional and 
managerial jobs, the coefficients before the race indicator dummy are much 
smaller than it is in the whole labor market sample and they are not statistically 
significant anymore. The unconditional racial wage gap in managerial jobs (12%) 
is relatively larger than that in professional jobs (2%) in magnitude, but academic 
skills can fully account for this racial gap. For professional jobs, I’m interested in 
why the racial wage gap has essentially disappeared even before controlling for 
academic skills. My first hypothesis is that today the black male professional 
workers on average have acquired the same level of premarket academic skills as 
white professional workers. If this is the case, we will be happy because it 
suggests the racial inequality in education has narrowed in the past 20 years. 
Unfortunately this is not the case. Data analysis shows that for those working in 
the professional occupations, black male workers on average scored 1.04 standard 
deviations below their white counterparts in the AFQT test and the difference is 
highly significant, suggesting there remains a quite large racial gap in education 
today. After I control for test scores, the coefficient on black indicator variable 
turns positive and relatively large in magnitude (0.10), but it is not significant. 
This cannot be interpreted as evidence that black professional workers are paid 
higher than their equally skilled white colleagues, but together with the finding 
that the academically disadvantaged black professional workers are earning as 
much as their white colleagues, they suggest that black professionals might have 
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gained bigger bargaining power in wage setting relative to the whites in the last 
20 years.  
One potential explanation for this change is the increasing demand for 
black workers in the professional field. A considerable proportion of professional 
workers work for academia, research institutes, different levels of government, or 
highly specialized entities such as law firms and hospitals. Most of these places 
have equal employment policies and many of them, universities for example, have 
explicit emphasis on ethnic diversity. While there is a demand for black workers 
in the professional occupations, the supply of black workers can be limited 
because of the highly technical and skill-intensive nature of the jobs and the fact 
that black people on average have lower skills and less professional trainings than 
white people. As a result, qualified black workers’ bargaining power increases. 
But again, since the positive coefficient found in professional jobs is statistically 
insignificant, we shouldn’t put too much emphasis on it until more concrete 
results are found. The important point is that there is no significant racial wage 
inequality in the white collar sector, both before and after controlling for 
academics skills. 
In the NLSY79 cohort, significant and substantial unconditional wage 
gaps still existed in the professional and managerial occupations, as well as in the 
overall white collar sector, although smaller than the gap in the overall labor 
market. The gap disappeared only after AFQT score was controlled for (Bjerk, 
2007).  
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C. Wage Inequality in the Blue Collar Sector 
 The results for the blue collar jobs are summarized in Table 4. The 
coefficients on the black dummy variable in Column9 and 10 show that there still 
exists significant unconditional racial wage inequality in the blue collar sector, 
and academic skills can only account for roughly one-third of this earning gap. 
The overall conditional racial wage gap is 13%, which is similar to the result 
obtained by Bjerk (2007) in NLSY79 cohort. The results for each sub-category 
are more mixed. Column 3 and 7 show that there are large unconditional income 
gaps in craftsmen and laborer jobs, larger than the gap in the overall labor market. 
Controlling for AFQT scores narrows down the gaps, but they still remain 
significantly large, meaning black workers earn significantly less than the 
similarly academically skilled white workers in these occupational categories and 
the inequality is substantially big. The coefficient before the black dummy in 
Column 1 indicates that there is a significant unconditional racial wage gap in 
clerical jobs. However, the gap disappears after controlling for premarket 
academic skills. The coefficient before the black dummy in Column 2 is very 
small and not significantly different from zero, while the coefficient before AFQT 
scores in the same column is positive and highly significant. This means all of the 
wage inequality in the clerical jobs can be explained by the racial difference in the 
premarket academic skills attainment. Surprisingly, the results for operative 
occupations are quite similar to those for professional occupations. Column 5 
shows that there is essentially no unconditional wage gap between black and 
white workers. After controlling for academic skills, the coefficient on the black
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 Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
LS Log W
age Regressions by O
ccupation Sector (Blue-collar Jobs) 
 
 
 
Specification 
 
 
 
C
lerical 
 
C
raftsm
en 
 
O
perators 
 
Laborers 
 
O
verall B
lue C
ollar 
C
onditioning V
ariable 
(1) 
(2) 
  
(3) 
(4) 
  
(5) 
(6) 
  
(7) 
(8) 
  
(9) 
(10) 
B
lack 
-0.14** 
-0.03 
 
-0.28*** 
-0.19** 
 
-0.03 
0.12 
 
-0.23** 
-0.17* 
 
-0.20*** 
-0.13*** 
 
 
 
(0.063) 
(0.069) 
 
(0.075) 
(0.083) 
 
(0.101) 
(0.122) 
 
(0.092) 
(0.099) 
 
(0.041) 
(0.045) 
A
FQ
T score 
—
 
0.09*** 
 
—
 
-0.02 
 
—
 
0.10 
 
—
 
0.01 
 
—
 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
 
(0.040) 
 
 
(0.072) 
 
 
(0.059) 
 
 
(0.024) 
A
FQ
T score squared 
—
 
0.01 
 
—
 
-0.09** 
 
—
 
-0.04 
 
—
 
-0.015** 
 
—
 
-0.07 
 
 
 
 
(0.034) 
 
 
(0.041) 
 
 
(0.065) 
 
 
(0.061) 
 
 
(0.024) 
A
ge 
0.00 
-0.01 
 
-0.09*** 
-0.08*** 
 
-0.03 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
-0.04** 
-0.04** 
 
 
 
(0.027) 
(0.027) 
 
(0.026) 
(0.026) 
 
(0.043) 
(0.046) 
 
(0.039) 
(0.040) 
 
(0.017) 
(0.017) 
12 years or m
ore of education 
—
 
0.18** 
 
—
 
0.15** 
 
—
 
-0.06 
 
—
 
0.13 
 
—
 
0.09** 
 
 
 
 
(0.078) 
 
 
(0.064) 
 
 
(0.110) 
 
 
(0.098) 
 
 
(0.042) 
C
ontrols for region of country 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
C
ontrols for parent's education 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
N
um
ber of observations 
192 
192 
  
390 
390 
  
157 
157 
  
237 
237 
  
976 
976 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ote: The sam
ple used is a subset of sam
ple used for Table 2 results. Standard errors are in parentheses.  O
ne asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, 
tw
o asterisks indicate significance at 5 percent level, three asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
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dummy turns positive and relatively large in magnitude, but not statistically 
significant, suggesting black operators are earning at least as much as their 
similarly skilled white counterparts, if not more. 
 In the results from the NLSY79 cohort, there were unconditional racial 
income gaps in all occupational categories in the blue collar sector and all the 
gaps remained significant after controlling for academic skills (Bjerk, 2007). 
Compared with my study, although the big picture in the blue collar sector seems 
not have changed that much, the patterns in each subcategory are quite different 
from 20 years ago. The racial wage inequality disappears in the clerical and 
operative jobs after taking academic skills into account. But in the craftsman and 
laborer jobs, the racial wage gaps grow even larger than they were twenty years 
ago.  
One potential explanation for the change in the racial wage inequality 
among clerical and operative occupations is that their work might require a higher 
level of academic skills than 20 years ago, making them more similar to those 
jobs classified as white collar jobs. One direct way to test this hypothesis is to 
examine the frequency of academic skills used by clerical and operative workers 
and compare them to the data of white collar workers. But unfortunately, such a 
study as MCSUI is not conducted recently. Therefore, I look at the schooling data 
and test scores to make comparisons across occupational categories. Firstly, note 
that the coefficient before AFQT scores for clerical jobs is 0.09 and statistically 
significant, which is the same as the coefficient for white collar jobs. By contrast,  
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the same coefficients for craftsman and laborer jobs are only -0.02 and 0.01 
respectively and are statistically insignificant. This suggests that the academic 
skills play a more important role in clerical jobs than other blue collar jobs today 
and they fully explain the racial wage gap among clerical occupations. For 
operative jobs, although the coefficient on AFQT score is comparable to those on 
white collar jobs in magnitude, it is statistically insignificant.  
Secondly, data on the years of schooling show that clerical jobs today 
resemble white collar jobs more than other blue collar jobs. As shown in Table 5, 
clerical workers receive significantly more years of education than craftsmen and 
Table 5     
Test Scores and Years of Education by Occupational Category 
Occupational Category AQFT score Years of Education 
Clerical  0.17 12.85 
  (0.073) (0.308) 
Operative  -0.38 10.89 
  (0.070) (0.337) 
Craftsmen+Laborers -0.31 10.70 
  (0.035) (0.166) 
White Collar 0.68 14.58 
  (0.040) (0.214) 
Clerical-(Craftsmen+Laborers) 0.47*** 2.16*** 
  (0.081) (0.350) 
Clerical-White Collar -0.52*** -1.73*** 
  (0.083) (0.375) 
Operative-(Craftsmen+Laborers) -0.07 0.19 
  (0.078) (0.376) 
Operative-White Collar -1.06*** -3.69*** 
    (0.080) (0.400) 
Note: The sample used in this analysis comes from the NLSY97 and consists of observations in the 
years 2008-2010, for male white and black workers in both the cross-section sample and black 
oversample, with valid ASVAB test scores, and a valid wage and occupation. AFQT scores are 
normalized to have a population mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, two asterisks indicate 
significance at 5 percent level, three asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
21 
 
laborer. Although they also receive significantly fewer years of education than 
white collar workers, the difference between clerical workers and white collar 
workers is smaller the difference between clerical workers and other blue collar 
workers. By contrast, the difference in the quantity of education between 
operative workers and white collar workers is larger than the difference between 
clerical workers and white collar workers. And operative workers’ years of 
education received are not significantly different from the amount received by 
craftsmen and laborers. Thirdly, data on AQFT scores show a similar pattern. 
Both clerical and operative workers achieve worse in academic skills than white 
collar workers, but the difference is smaller for clerical workers than operative 
workers. Clerical workers’ test scores are significantly higher than craftsmen and 
laborers, while operative workers’ scores are no different from other two groups. 
All these results confirm that today clerical jobs are more similar to white collar 
jobs than to blue collar jobs in terms of the employees’ educational background 
and academic skills. However, this is not the case for operative jobs. 
It’s hard to see why the results for operative jobs show a similar pattern as 
professional jobs. One interesting finding in the operative category is that the 
black workers in a specific subcategory, assembling jobs, are enjoying a 
significant wage premium over their similarly skilled white counterparts. There 
might be some omitted variable that can potentially explain this odd phenomenon, 
but since the sample size in this subgroup is very small, I cannot rule out the 
possibility of measurement error.   
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D. Wage Inequality in Sales and Service Jobs  
Due to the heterogeneity among sales and service jobs, these two 
categories are discussed separately. The results of OLS log wage regressions are 
shown in Table 6.  Column 1 shows that there is a 22 percent unconditional racial 
wage gap between black and white sales workers. However, most of this 
inequality can be accounted for by premarket academic skills. The coefficient 
before the black dummy in Column 2 is still negative, but statistically 
insignificant. There is a racial wage gap, unconditional and conditional, in the 
service occupations, but the differences are not significant. In the NLSY79 cohort, 
a substantial racial wage inequality existed in sales jobs even after controlling for 
academic skills. One potential explanation for the disappearance of that wage 
inequality in my study is the decrease in customer discrimination over the last 
twenty years. Because the nature of the sales jobs, if the customers are strongly 
discriminating against the black workers, we can expect the black wages to be 
negatively affected by this discrimination. The results in my study suggest that 
unless the employers are compensating black sales workers for some reason, the 
effect of customer discrimination is small either because the customers no longer 
discriminate against black workers or because the black workers can avoid facing 
the prejudiced customers directly by making the sales through the phone or 
online, for example.  
In general, the results in Table 3-6 show that racial wage inequality has 
largely disappeared in the white collar sector. All of the racial wage gap in the 
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labor market after controlling for premarket academic skills comes from two 
subcategories in the blue collar sector, specifically, craftsmen and laborers. There 
is unconditional racial wage inequality among clerical and sales jobs, but 
academic skills can account for all the wage gaps in these categories. The racial 
wage gap in operative jobs has also disappeared today, but the reason for that is 
unclear. 
V. Explanations for Different Wage Inequality across Occupational 
Categories 
 As I show in the previous section, academic skills can fully account for the 
racial wage gap among clerical jobs and clerical jobs resemble white collar jobs 
Table 6 
       OLS Log Wage Regressions by Occupation Sector (Sales and Service Jobs) 
   
Specification 
   
Sales   Service 
Conditioning Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Black -0.22*** -0.09  -0.10 -0.08 
   
(0.074) (0.080)  (0.074) (0.084) 
AFQT score — 0.10***  — 0.00 
   
 (0.040)   (0.050) 
AFQT score squared — -0.10**  — -0.05 
   
 (0.038)   (0.049) 
Age -0.05 -0.06**  -0.08** -0.09** 
   
(0.030) (0.029)  (0.034) (0.034) 
12 years or more of education — 0.19**  — 0.08 
   
 (0.081)   (0.079) 
Controls for region of country no yes  no yes 
Controls for parent's education no yes  no yes 
Number of observations 214 214   395 395 
        Note: The sample used is a subset of sample used for Table 2 results. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, two asterisks indicate 
significance at 5 percent level, three asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
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more than other blue collar jobs. Therefore, I group clerical jobs together with 
white collar jobs in this section and label them as “skill-intensive” jobs. By 
contrast, I label craftsmen and laborers as “labor intensive” jobs. I show that both 
models of preference-based discrimination and statistical discrimination can 
explain the difference in racial wage inequality between these two occupational 
categories. Other explanations for the cross-occupational difference are briefly 
discussed in the end.  
A. Theories of Labor Market Discrimination 
 One common explanation for the racial wage inequality is the labor 
market discrimination. There is a substantial collection of literature showing that 
discrimination widely exists in the labor market. For example, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) conducted an audit study and showed that individuals with 
distinctive black names receive fewer responses from employers than those with 
distinctive white names, while everything else on their resumes are equal. If 
discrimination is the cause of racial wage inequality, there must be some reason 
that discrimination can only persist in craftsman and laborer jobs, since 
conditional racial gaps are only observed among these two occupational 
categories but not others. Both the Preference-based Discrimination and the 
Statistical Discrimination models are consistent with my findings.  
 For preference-based discrimination to persist, the labor market must 
satisfy one of the two conditions: (1) the market is not very competitive, or (2) the 
benefit loss for a firm to act on prejudice is small. If a firm acts on its racial 
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prejudice by hiring a white worker over a black worker with similar or better 
skills, it will suffer a profit loss. Unless the firm has large market power, such as 
in the case of monopoly or oligopoly, so that there are enough profits remaining 
for the firm to survive, it must be the case that the profit loss from acting on bias 
is negligible for the company. Otherwise the firm won’t be able to maintain its 
position in the market and will be driven out by its more profitable competitors.  
Due to the broad range of job titles within each occupational category, as 
can be seen in Table 1, I argue that the market for each category is reasonably 
competitive. Therefore, I will focus on the second condition. In skill-intensive 
jobs, productivity is highly associated with academic skills. Therefore, if the firm 
acts on its racial bias by hiring white employees over black people with similar or 
greater skills, it will suffer a large profit loss due to the lower productivity, which 
makes the firm hard to survive in the competition. However for the labor-
intensive jobs, the skills are only weakly related to productivity. Therefore, it’s 
not very costly for firms to act on their racial bias and they are still able to stay 
relatively competitive in the market. As a result, the preference-base 
discrimination explains why the conditional racial inequality exists in the labor-
intensive jobs but not in the skill-intensive jobs. 
 A Statistical Discrimination theory can also explain the observed 
differences in wage inequality across different categories. This theory argues that 
the employers are not biased, but are using race, correctly, as a convenient and 
cheap proxy of certain hardly obtainable characteristics in the hiring process for 
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the profit maximization reason. For example, Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2006) 
found that without background checks, certain employers use race as a signal of 
criminality and statistically discriminate against black people.  This results from 
imperfect information. Employers are always trying to find the true level of skills 
of the applicants. However, besides easily observable variables such as years of 
education, there are some variables related to academic skills that are available to 
economists but not to employers, such as AFQT scores. The employers can use 
other techniques to obtain more accurate information on the job-seekers’ skills, 
such as interviews and company-administrated tests. But these techniques are 
usually costly and time-consuming. Therefore, from the profit-maximization 
perspective, it’s only worth spending the time and money on the candidates 
applying for jobs on which skills are highly important. For the labor-intensive 
jobs, academic skills are only weakly associated with productivity and therefore 
it’s not very helpful and worthwhile to put time and money in assessing the 
precise level of skills of the candidates. Since race is usually correlated with skills 
and is easily observable, certain profit-maximizing employers will use race as a 
proxy of skill. On average black people have poorer academic skills than white 
people. As a result, black workers on average receive lower wages than their 
similarly skilled white counterparts in labor-intensive jobs but not in the skill-
intensive jobs.  
 The statistical discrimination model is more relevant during the hiring 
process. But as the employees start working, the learning models argue that the 
employers will gradually get a better picture of the workers’ actual skills as 
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observations accumulate and as a result the wages will be more and more 
correlated with academic skills (Farber & Gibbons, 1996; Altonji & Pierret, 
2001). However, labor-intensive jobs usually have a high turnover rate as many 
workers work for employers only for a short term and will change to another 
employer once the current project or contract is over. As a result, it’s hard for 
employers to collect observations on the workers’ skills and these workers are 
more likely to become the victims of statistical discrimination when they change 
jobs. What’s more, the economic downturns, such as the Great Recession 
experienced by the individuals in my sample, could also somewhat encourage the 
statistical discrimination. As the needs to save costs and stay alive increased 
drastically during the Great Recession, employers are more likely to use race as a 
cheap signal of skills when hiring for labor-intensive jobs. 
B. Other Explanations  
 Besides the preference and statistical discrimination models, omitted 
variable bias and measurement error can also lead to different racial wage 
inequality across occupational categories. AFQT score is the only measure of 
premarket academic skills I use in my study. It is a noisy measure of skills. If 
there are some other variables that are correlated with race and productivity, 
especially when they are more important in the labor-intensive jobs than in the 
skill-intensive jobs, for instance some nonacademic skills, the omission of such 
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variables, or using AFQT score as the only proxy of skills in the regressions can 
lead to the observed racial wage inequality.2  
Both the preference-based and statistical models of discrimination cannot 
explain the wage pattern observed in operative jobs very well. The operative 
workers share similar characteristics with craftsmen and laborers in terms of their 
academic skills and education attainment. It’s hard to see what makes operative 
job market different from craftsman and laborer job markets. One can study the 
competitiveness in these markets. If the operative job market is more competitive 
than other blue collar job markets, then the preference-based discrimination 
model is consistent with my findings. Just based on my sample, the observed 
wage pattern among operative jobs is very likely due to omitted variable bias or 
measurement error.  
 Due to the heterogeneity among Sales and Service jobs, I leave them out 
in this section. In the future, researchers can look further into these two 
occupations by dividing each of them into more specific categories.  
VI. Labor Market Participation 
 Labor market participation is an important issue that should be taken into 
account when interpreting my results. Joining or leaving the labor market can be a 
choice that is affected by discrimination. If some black people choose to quit the 
labor market because they are facing racial discrimination on the job in the form 
2 For details on the effects of omitted variable bias and measurement error on racial wage 
inequality, see Bjerk (2007). 
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of unreasonably low wages, by only considering those who are currently 
employed, my results will overstate the median wage of the blacks relative to the 
whites, therefore underestimating the actual degree of racial inequality. What’s 
more, it’s argued that many labor market drop-outs are poorly skilled blacks and 
if they had jobs, they would likely receive wages lower than the mean black 
wages. If this is the case, my results also underestimate the actual racial wage gap 
by not including these low-skill black drop-outs.  
As shown in Table 7, black males constitute a significantly larger 
proportion of the population among the unemployed than employed during the 
period 2008-2010. This statistic alone doesn’t tell us much information because 
there can be many reasons that one chooses not to have a job. The results in the 
second row show that black labor market non-participants have lower test scores 
than those black participants and the difference is significant. By contrast, there is 
no significant difference in the test scores between white non-participants and 
participants. These results confirm that black men without earnings are more 
likely to be those with poor academic skills. If these black non-participants had 
been working, on average they would have received lower wages than an average 
black worker. As the result of not taking these people into account, my results 
underestimate the actual racial wage inequality. The time period of the data 
collected in this study coincides with the Great Recession. During the recession, 
the unemployment rate in the US increased drastically, and those workers with 
lower skills were more likely to be fired. Since black males are more likely to be 
poorly skilled than white males, they were disproportionally hit by the recession.
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-0.61 
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-0.11* 
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-0.11** 
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The exit of these people narrowed down the actual racial wage gap in my study 
for the reasons I discussed above. One way to get a more precise picture of the 
racial wage inequality in the US is to examine the wage gap with new data after 
the distorting effects of the Great Recession are gone.  
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper I examined the wage inequality between male black and 
white workers using the most recent labor market data. I found that the 
unconditional racial wage gap is smaller than it was twenty years ago. Differences 
in premarket academic skills can account for roughly half of the unconditional 
wage gap but the black workers on average still earn 11 percent less than their 
comparable white counterparts, and the conditional wage gap is roughly the same 
as it was twenty years ago. After further dividing the labor market into white 
collar and blue collar sectors, I found that all of the conditional wage inequality 
comes from the craftsman and laborer jobs under the blue collar sector. Academic 
skills can fully account for the unconditional racial wage gap in the white collar 
jobs and clerical jobs. My results showed that today the clerical workers are more 
similar to white collar workers than blue collar workers in terms of their academic 
skills and education attainment. The racial wage gap in operative jobs has also 
disappeared, but the reason is unclear. Measurement error and omitted variable 
bias are two possible explanations. 
 I discussed why conditional racial wage inequality persists in labor-
intensive jobs (Craftsman and Laborer), but not in skill-intensive jobs (White 
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Collar Jobs plus Clerical Jobs). Both the preference-based discrimination and 
statistical discrimination theories can explain the observed wage difference across 
occupational sectors. The key assumption for both theories is that academic skills 
are highly related with productivity in skill-intensive jobs but only weakly related 
with productivity in labor-intensive jobs. The preference-based discrimination 
theory shows that acting on prejudice by hiring white workers over equally or 
better skilled black workers will only lead to small profit loss for a labor-intensive 
company and therefore the company can still survive in the competition. On the 
contrary, acting on prejudice will lead to a large profit loss for a skill-intensive 
company, making the company more likely to be driven out by more profitable 
competitors. As a result the preference discrimination only persists in the labor-
intensive jobs. The statistical discrimination is based on the assumption of 
imperfect information. It’s possible but expensive to find out the accurate level of 
skills of a job candidate. While employers in the skill-intensive market will try 
their best to uncover the true skills of a candidate, it’s not worthwhile for the 
employers of labor-intensive jobs to invest heavily in skill assessment since skills 
are only weakly related to productivity in labor-intensive jobs. Instead they use 
race as a cheap and convenient proxy of skills. As a result, the blacks in labor-
intensive jobs are paid less than the comparable whites. Besides the 
discrimination models, omitted variable bias and measurement error can lead to 
different racial wage inequality across occupational categories.   
 My results are limited by sample size. The number of observations in each 
of my occupational categories ranges from 157 to 390, which limits the statistical 
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power of my model to find significance in the results. Therefore, except for the 
results for Overall White Collar, Overall Blue Collar, Overall Labor Market, 
results for other categories should be interpreted with caution.  
 My results are likely to underestimate the actual black-white wage gap in 
the US. Poorly skilled black people are more vulnerable to economic shocks and 
more likely to be unemployed. When they have jobs, they are likely to receive 
wages lower than the median black wage.  By excluding such black labor market 
dropouts in my analysis, I underestimated the actual wage gap. 
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Appendix 
Results Obtained by Bjerk (2007) Using the NLSY79 Cohort 
There are two major differences between Bjerk’s (2007) methods and mine. One, 
Bjerk (2007) obtained wage data of the individuals for each year of observation 
between 1990 and 1992 and ran Random Effects Generalized Least Square (GLS) 
regressions, while I take the average of each individual’s wage over the three year 
period 2008-2010 and run Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. Two, Bjerk 
(2007) included 14 years or more of education and 16 years or more of education 
as two additional control dummy variables in some of his regressions, but I only 
include 12 years of more of education in my regressions.  
Table 8 
      Random Effects GLS Log Wage Regressions (Whole Labor Market) 
   
Specification 
Conditioning Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Black -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.08*** -0.10*** 
   
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
AFQT score — — 0.19*** 0.09*** 
     
(0.009) (0.011) 
AFQT score squared — — 0.01** -0.01* 
     
(0.007) (0.008) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
   
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
12 years or more of education — 0.16*** — 0.07*** 
    
(0.022) 
 
(0.023) 
14 years or more of education — 0.15*** — 0.08*** 
    
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
16 years or more of education — 0.23*** — 0.17*** 
    
(0.023) 
 
(0.024) 
Controls for year of observation yes yes yes yes 
Controls for region of country no yes yes yes 
Controls for parent's education no no no yes 
Number of observations 7749 
   Number of Individuals 3059       
 
            
Note: The sample used in this analysis comes from the NLS79 and consists of observations in the years 1990 
to 1992, for male white and black workers, not in the low-income white or military oversamples, with valid 
ASVAB test scores, and a valid CPS wage and occupation. AFQT scores are age-adjusted and normalized to 
have a population mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors are in parentheses. One 
asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, two asterisks indicate significance at 5 percent level, three 
asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
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Table 9 
          Random Effects GLS Log Wage Regressions by Occupation Sector (White Collar Jobs) 
   
Specification 
   
Professional  Managerial  Overall White Collar 
Conditioning Variable (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Black -0.14*** 0.01 
 
-0.16** 0.01 
 
-0.17*** -0.01 
   
-0.045 (0.050) 
 
(0.067) (0.072) 
 
(0.035) (0.038) 
AFQT score — 0.09** 
 
— 0.16*** 
 
— 0.11*** 
    
(0.037) 
  
(0.042) 
  
(0.024) 
AFQT score squared — 0.03 
 
— 0.02 
 
— 0.01 
    
(0.025) 
  
(0.033) 
  
(0.017) 
Age 0.02** 0.02*** 
 
0.06*** 0.04*** 
 
0.03*** 0.03*** 
   
(0.009) (0.008) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
 
(0.007) (0.006) 
12 years or more of education — 0.24* 
 
— -0.01 
 
— 0.08 
    
(0.140) 
  
(0.138) 
  
(0.088) 
14 years or more of education — 0.1 
 
— 0.05 
 
— 0.11*** 
    
(0.062) 
  
(0.067) 
  
(0.041) 
16 years or more of education — 0.20*** 
 
— 0.09 
 
— 0.17** 
    
(0.045) 
  
(0.070) 
  
(0.035) 
Controls for year of observation yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Controls for region of country no yes 
 
no yes 
 
no yes 
Controls for parent's education no yes 
 
no yes 
 
no yes 
Number of obsevations 1225 1225  386 386  2029 2029 
Number of Individuals 622 622   278 278   1040 1040 
           Note: The sample used is a subset of sample used for Table 8 results. Standard errors are in parentheses.  One 
asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, two asterisks indicate significance at 5 percent level, three 
asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
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 Table 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Random
 Effects G
LS Log W
age Regressions by O
ccupation Sector (Blue Collar Jobs) 
 
 
 
Specification 
 
 
 
C
lerical 
 
C
raftsm
en 
 
O
perators 
 
Laborers 
 
O
verall B
lue C
ollar 
C
onditioning V
ariable 
(1) 
(2) 
  
(3) 
(4) 
  
(5) 
(6) 
  
(7) 
(8) 
  
(9) 
(10) 
B
lack 
-0.26*** 
-0.12** 
 
-0.24*** 
-0.09** 
 
-0.17*** 
-0.08** 
 
-0.18** 
-0.09** 
 
-0.24*** 
-0.12*** 
 
 
 
(0.042) 
(0.052) 
 
(0.03) 
(0.034) 
 
(0.028) 
(0.034) 
 
(0.035) 
(0.043) 
 
(0.018) 
(0.021) 
A
FQ
T score 
—
 
0.11** 
 
—
 
0.06*** 
 
—
 
0.01 
 
—
 
0.02 
 
—
 
0.07*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.030) 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
 
(0.031) 
 
 
(0.012) 
A
FQ
T score squared 
—
 
-0.05** 
 
—
 
-0.03* 
 
—
 
-0.03** 
 
—
 
-0.04** 
 
—
 
-0.03*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.024) 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
 
(0.009) 
A
ge 
0.03** 
0.02* 
 
-0.09*** 
0.02*** 
 
0.02** 
0.02*** 
 
0.02*** 
0.02*** 
 
0.02*** 
0.01*** 
 
 
 
(0.009) 
(0.009) 
 
(0.026) 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
(0.004) 
12 years or m
ore of education 
—
 
0.1 
 
—
 
0.10*** 
 
—
 
0.10*** 
 
—
 
0.07 
 
—
 
0.07*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.089) 
 
 
(0.037) 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
 
(0.044) 
 
 
(0.023) 
14 years or m
ore of education 
—
 
0.05 
 
—
 
0.04 
 
—
 
0.04 
 
—
 
0.07 
 
—
 
0.07*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.048) 
 
 
(0.034) 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
 
(0.022) 
16 years or m
ore of education 
—
 
0.04 
 
—
 
0.07 
 
—
 
0.01 
 
—
 
-0.06 
 
—
 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
 
(0.067) 
 
 
(0.082) 
 
 
(0.102) 
 
 
(0.034) 
C
ontrols for year of observation 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
C
ontrols for region of country 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
C
ontrols for parent's education 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
N
um
ber of observations 
622 
622 
 
1667 
1667 
 
1475 
1475 
 
911 
911 
 
5720 
5720 
N
um
ber of observations 
410 
410 
  
967 
967 
  
875 
875 
  
640 
640 
  
2431 
2431 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ote: The sam
ple used is a subset of sam
ple used for Table 8 results. Standard errors are in parentheses.  O
ne asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, 
tw
o asterisks indicate significance at 5 percent level, three asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
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Table 11 
       Random Effects GLS Log Wage Regressions by Occupation Sector (Sales and Service 
Jobs) 
   
Specification 
   
Sales   Service 
Conditioning Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Black -0.32*** -0.18**  -0.24*** -0.03 
   
(0.073) (0.087)  (0.040) (0.046) 
AFQT score — 0.07  — 0.11*** 
   
 (0.049)   (0.028) 
AFQT score squared — 0.01  — 0.01 
   
 (0.037)   (0.019) 
Age 0.03** 0.03**  0.01 0.01* 
   
(0.014) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.008) 
12 years or more of education — -0.01  — 0.01 
   
 (0.186)   (0.050) 
14 years or more of education — 0.13  — 0.18*** 
   
 (0.088)   (0.047) 
16 years or more of education — 0.21***  — 0.08 
   
 (0.080)   (0.067 
Controls for year of observation yes yes  yes yes 
Controls for region of country no yes  no yes 
Controls for parent's education no yes  no yes 
Number of observations 418 418  930 930 
Number of Individuals 259 259   515 515 
        Note: The sample used is a subset of sample used for Table 8 results. Standard errors are in parentheses.  One 
asterisk indicates significance at 10 percent level, two asterisks indicate significance at 5 percent level, three 
asterisks indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
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